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Abstract 
This paper addresses issues related to how the absentee voter actually casts their bal­
lot on propositions. If the liberalization of absentee laws changed either the composition 
or behavior of the electorate then the outcome of the· election may be affected. 
This paper tests whether the electoral behavior of absentee and precinct voters differs 
in regards to voting on propositions. The analysis is based on sample of actual absentee 
and precinct voter ballots drawn from the approximately three million ballots cast in 
Los Angeles county for the 1992 general election. The analysis uses a nested model of 
voter participation and is estimated using the weighted exogenous sampling maximum 
likelihood method. 
We find that precinct and absentee voters do differ on both the propositions they cast 
votes on, and in their propensity to vote "Yes" for a proposition. For example, absentees 
appear to vote on fewer bonds and initiatives than do precinct voters. They also vote on 
fewer propositions dealing with state taxes, food taxes, and property taxes. In addition, 
given that a voter casts a valid vote, the propensity for absentee voters to vote "Yes" is 
higher on initiatives and propositions related to education, welfare, and health care than 
it is for precinct voters. 
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COMPARING ABSENTEE AND PRECINCT VOTERS: 
VOTING ON DIRECT LEGISLATION* 
Jeffrey A. Dubin Gretchen A. Kalsow 
1 Introduction 
It has been asserted that absentee voters have been the decisive group in several recent 
state-wide candidate elections. While campaign organizers in California have demon­
strated their prowess at attracting the absentee vote for candidates, they haven't actively 
sought absentee votes for propositions. Proposition outcomes are potentially affected in 
at least three different ways by the recent increase in absentee voting. First, an interest 
group supporting a proposition could have it's own absentee voter drive, or coordinate 
such a drive with a major candidate. Although this has not happened yet, it is surely one 
of next moves being considered by proposition supporters. Second, to the extent that 
candidate absentee drives are successful, they may alter the composition of the electorate. 
A third influence may result from absentees modifying their voting behavior, as com­
pared to their behavior as precinct voters. Hamilton (1988, p. 860) lists several advan­
tages of all-mail elections, including ''an increase in the integrity of elections as a result 
of more time for voters to consider issues before casting their ballots." If Hamilton is 
correct, then the additional time spent by absentee voters considering how to cast their 
ballots may result in absentees voting on different measures and casting their votes dif­
ferently than if they had voted at the precinct. Thus the pattern of votes cast and the 
propensity to vote "Yes" may differ when voters switch from voting at the precinct to 
voting at home. 
In this paper we examine the voting behavior of absentee voters, as compared to 
precinct voters, in voting on direct legislation. Specifica1ly, we examine differences in 
proposition voting behavior by analyzing the effect of proposition form (bond, legislative 
*The helpful comments of Santa Traugott and seminar participants are gratefully acknowledged. An
earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, IL, April 6-8, 1995. 
proposal, or initiative) and proposition content.1 In our model of proposition voting a 
voter first determines whether or not the issue is important, and if so, how to cast their 
vote on the specific proposition. This model is depicted in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 Here] 
The first decision we analyze empirically is the decision to cast a vote on a proposition. 
We control for a voter's demographics and socioeconomic characteristics while examining 
the effect of proposition form and content on the probability of casting a vote. Next we 
analyze the propensity to vote "Yes" conditional on voting, again investigating the impact 
of form and content. 
Because little is known about absentee voters from prior studies of voter behavior, 
the focus of this paper is on discovering the rudimentary differences in the ballots cast by 
absentee and precinct voters. Mueller's (1969) pioneering study of voter fatigue and drop­
off employed a sample of ballots that was primarily from absentee voters, and concluded 
that voters do indeed drop-off between candidate r<l:ces and propositions. 
To date, we have reached three preliminary conclusions regarding absentee voting in 
California. First, in more recent California elections (1988 through 1992) absentee voters 
in Los Angeles county voted on approximately five percent fewer propositions than did 
their precinct voting counterparts. Second, Dubin and Kalsow ( 1995) find that absentee 
voting is a substitute activity for precinct voting in general elections, although they are 
not perfect substitutes. This implies that the composition of the electorate may have 
changed. In addition, Dubin and Kalsow find that the pool of absentee voters is not 
random. The propensity to vote absentee is positively related to being over 64 years old 
and to the presence of young children in the home. Absentee voting is also negatively 
related to education, being unemployed, and homeownership. 
More generally, we know that voters respond differently to propositions of varying 
lengths, complexity, content, and form. 2 This paper addresses the question of whether 
the drop-off that Mueller found was an artifact of his use of absentee ballots, or if the 
pattern of votes on propositions is similar for absentee and precinct voters. We analyze 
the voting behavior of precinct and absentee voters in terms of their propensity to vote 
on particular propositions and their propensity to vote "Yes," given the form and content 
of the proposition. 
The next section of this paper outlines the theory of proposition voting. Section 3 
briefly describes the data sources and independent variables employed. Section 4 discusses 
1 Differences in behavior related to proposition form and content may be related to the phenomenon 
known as roll-off and voter fatigue .. See Dubin and Kalsow (1994a) for additional information on these 
topics. 
2Refer to Dubin and Kalsow ( 1994a) for additional information regarding an analysis of ballot roll-off 
and voter fatigue. 
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the econometric approach used to estimate our model of proposition voting and section 5 
highlights prior results regarding proposition voting behavior that are applicable to our 
model. Section 6 describes the hypotheses that will be tested. The last two sections 
present the results, their implications on future policy, and directions for further research. 
2 Theory of Proposition Voting 
Relatively few studies of proposition voting have been reported. Price ( 1975) finds that 
Western states are more likely to provide for the use of initiatives, and their electorate 
votes on initiatives with greater frequency as compared with the behavior in Eastern 
states. Owens and Wade (1986) find that the probability that a proposition passes and 
the inflation adjusted campaign related expenditures have both been stable over time. 3 
Zisk (1987) examines the decrease in participation on propositions compared to top 
candidate races by using aggregate election results and survey data from four states over 
five years. She finds that a voter's decision to cast a vote, vote negatively, or abstain is 
unrelated to proposition position. Zisk also finds support for increased levels of voting 
on citizen initiated propositions over legislative proposals. 
In addition to proposition voting, ballot roll-off and voter fatigue theories are relevant 
to our analysis. Burnham (1965) determines that roll-off and split-ticket voting have 
increased from 1907 to 1962. Mueller (1969) attributes roll-off to campaign spending 
and voting behavior on surrounding propositions. His analysis also concludes that the 
number of negative votes increases with ballot position. 
Magleby's (1984) book, Direct Legislation, explores many aspects of proposition vot­
ing and reports the drop-off percentages for California propositions from 1970 to 1982. 
He finds evidence that longer ballots impact drop-off, but his results were not consistent 
across time. Magleby also reports that nonwhite voters vote on fewer issues, as did older 
voters, blue collar voters, and low income voters. In addition, he finds that education is 
positively correlated with ballot completion. These results are consistent with those of 
Clubb and Traugott (1972). They confirm that white, educated, higher income, higher 
social class individuals who read the newspaper and are more interested in politics vote 
more often on referenda. Magleby also reports that proposition readability affects par­
ticipation level, and that voters haYe an increased propensity to vote on initiatives over 
legislative proposals. 
More recent work has been published by Vanderleeuw and Engstrom ( 1987), Darcy 
and Schneider (1989), and Bowler, ,Don0van and Happ (1992). Vanderleeuw and En­
gstrom report that African-Americans roll-off at faster rates than whites, even when 
controlling for age and education. Darcy and Schneider find that confusing and complex 
ballots lead to more roll-off. Bowler. Donovan, and Happ demonstrate that aggregate 
3See also the studies of Wolfinger and Greenstein (1968) and Hamilton (1970) on the repeal of the
Fair Housing Act in California. 
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proposition voting is related to the total campaign spending, type of proposition, source 
of the proposition, length, and turnout.4 
Using Los Angeles county data Dubin and Kalsow (1994a) find evidence of both roll­
off and ballot fatigue. Ceteris paribus, the probability of a voter abstaining increases 
further into the ballot, as does the propensity to cast a "No" vote. In addition, they find 
that both the form and the content of a proposition affect the propensity to vote and the 
propensity to vote "Yes" on a given proposition. 
3 Data Sources and Independent Variables 
The primary data source for this analysis are the ballot image files prepared by the Cal­
ifornia Secretary of State. These files contain one record for each ballot cast in the 1992 
general election in Los Angeles county. A secondary data source is the decennial book 
on congressional districts published by Congressional Quarterly. It provides the demo­
graphic information for each congressionai district. In addition, the California Secretary 
of State publishes the Statement of Vote (SOV ) which provides registration and vote 
totals by precinct. These totals are used as a validation of the ballot image decoding 
process described below. The Secretary of State also provides an election ballot book 
which contains proposition-specific information, such as the official ballot description. 
3.1 Ballot Images 
Our primary data source comes from a sample of the 2,831,077 actual punch-card ballots 
cast in Los Angeles county in the 1992 general election. As the voter turns a page in the 
ballot book, they also move one column to the right on the punch-card, perforating the 
card in a specified box to indicate their vote. The evening of the election the cards are 
collected and transported to a central location where a. machine reads the cards. As a 
by-product of tabulating the votes, a. binary image of each ballot is written to a. magnetic 
tape. This tape, after extensive manipulation, provides the data for this analysis. 
There are several factors which complicate the decoding of ballots from the ballot 
image tape. 5 The first is that the ballot image tape is not used for official purposes so its 
creation is often an ad hoc procedure. For example, if some ballots within a processing 
group are misfed into the reader. the entire group may be re-read. Our procedures were 
designed to identify and eliminate such duplications. Another complication comes from 
the use of ballot groups. Each unique combination of contests and rotation sequences 
constitutes a ballot group.6 An additional complication is that up to four ca.rd readers 
4Matsusaka ( 1992) considers the decision by elected officials to either resolve issues or place them 
before the people, and if they opt for a popular vote on an issue, why some voters then abstain. 
5See Dubin and Gerber (1992) for additional information on decoding these ballot images. 
6There were 235 ballot groups in the 1992 general election. The candidates are "rotated" to minimize 
any order effects. In this way any advantage to being first on the list of candidates is distributed among 
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can be processing ballots simultaneously, and the ballot images are written to the same 
tape. This means that the ballot images on the tape must be "unshuffied" into distinct 
precincts prior to processing. 
The last step of the decoding process is to match a "correction" tape to the original 
precinct ballot images, and compare vote counts to the SOY. The completeness and 
accuracy of this correction tape, and hence the match rate to the SOY, varies by election. 7 
3.2 Sampling from the Data 
Since the actual 1992 general election had almost three million ballots, a sample was 
selected for econometric analysis. The sampling process selects ballots from each precinct 
whose ballot count matches that found in the SOY, and from each absent�e ballot group 
whose ballot count matches that found in the SOY. The number of ballots selected from 
each precinct is proportionate to the total number of ballots cast from that precinct. A 
0.21 percent sample of the valid precinct ballots is combined with a 1.29 percent over­
sample of the absentee ballots to create a dataset of 5,028 precinct ballots and 5,009 
absentee ballots. This sample of ballots is then pooled across the thirteen propositions 
appearing on the ballot, resulting in a total of 130,481 observations.8 
3.3 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable for the vote decision is based on the coded response of the 
subject; voting either "yes" or "no" on a specific proposition sets the "vote" indicator 
to "l," while abstaining or invalidating the vote sets the "vote" indicator to "O." The 
dependent variable for the outcome decision is set to "1" if the voter votes "yes," and 
"O" otherwise, as long as the voter casts a valid vote for that proposition. 
3.4 Explanatory Factors 
The independent variables are one of two types: proposition-specific characteristics ( Zj 
for proposition j), or individual-specific variables, i.e., demographics, (vVi for individual 
i), as reported in Table 1. The proposition-specific factors include the proposition form, 
all the candidates. Each ballot group locates a particular contest in a different punch position, depending 
on both the number of previous contests .and on the number of candidat.es in the previous contests. 
7For the 1992 general election we were able to match 99.5 percent of precincts exactly when comparing 
total vote counts as reported in the SOV to the number of ballot images determined from the ballot 
image tapes. 
8The mean sample and Los Angeles county voting percentages are 86.9 percent and 88.1 percent, 
respectively. The mean frequencies of voting "Yes" on a proposition in the sample is 46.2 percent, and 
45.8 percent in Los Angeles county. The completion rate across all propositions for absentee voters is 
84.9 percent, and 89.6 percent. for precinct voters. 
content, and characteristics of the official ballot description. Individual-specific variables 
are matched to each ballot image using an identifier for the voter's congressional district 
that is located on the ballot image. This is necessary since individual level demographic 
information is, of course, not contained on the ballot image data. 
The proposition-specific variables included in the analysis are the proposition form, 
content, reading ease score, and word count. The proposition form conveys information 
on the author or source of the proposition, as well as its relative ballot position. Bonds 
appear first on the ballot, then legislative proposals, and last are the initiatives. 9 Both 
the bonds and the legislative proposals are placed on the ballot by the state legislature, 
while initiatives qualify through a process involving a petition requiring an appropriate 
number of registered voter signatures.10 We group the propositions into major content
areas: humanitarian (education, welfare, health, and physician-assisted death), taxes 
(food taxes, property taxes, and state taxes) and "other" (term limits, toll roads, rail 
transit, state government). The reading ease score is the Flesch score, as described in 
Magleby (1984). It serves as a proxy for the comprehension of the proposition's impact, 
while the number of English words appearing in the official ballot description is a proxy 
for the patience and time required to muddle through the proposition's description. 
[Table 1 Here] 
The individual-specific variables include race, socioeconomic, social connectedness, 
and party affiliation variables. The race variable in our model is the percentage of the 
population that report African-American on the census.11 The socioeconomic factors
considered are the median family income (in OOOO's) and the percentage of adults over 
age 25 that did not complete high school. The social connectedness factors (Teixeira 
(1992)) include the percentage of households residing in owner-occupied housing units. 
·We measure the conservativeness of the congressional district using the percentage of
registered voters that are Republican. Finally, we employ an indicator for whether the
voter cast an absentee ballot or not.
9Since California law stipulates the order of propositions by form on the ballot, we are unable to 
identify both the form and proposition position in our model. Because bonds appear first the indicator for 
bonds may also be viewed as an indicator for the "beginning" of the propositions. Similarly, the legislative 
proposal and initiative indicators could be construed as the "middle" and "end" of the propositions, 
respectively. This problem would exist in any analysis using a single election or series of elect.ions where 
the legislature passed the bond bill before the required date. One notable exception to the ordering of 
propositions occurred in the 1990 general election when the legislature failed to pass the bond bill in a 
timely fashion, whicfrresulted in bonds being placed last on the ballot. 
10Refer to Fitzgerald ( 1980) for additional information on qualifying a proposition for the ballot in 
California. 
1 1  Los Angeles county is racially and ethnically diverse, with large populations of Asian-Americans and 
Latino-Americans. Our models were tested with factors reflecting the percentage of Asian-Americans 
and Latino-Americans and neither factor was found to be statistically significant. 
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4 Estimation Techniques 
In this section we develop our model of proposition voting using a discrete choice econo­
metric framework. Since, by design, our sample of the ballots cast in the 1992 general 
election has over-sampled absentee voters, we employ a weighted exogenous maximum 
likelihood estimator. 
4.1 Discrete-Choice Model of Proposition Voting 
There are two decisions required of a voter in the voting booth-whether to cast a vote on 
a particular contest or not, and declaring their position on that contest. Refer to Figure 
1. Let i = 1, .. . , I, represent the individuals, j = 1, ... , J, the propositions. Further, 
let k = 0, 1 and m = 0, 1 represent the choices made by an individual voter. In the 
first decision k = 1 represents the decision to vote on a specific proposition, and k = 0 
represents the decision to abstain. The act of voting "Yes" on a proposition is represented 
by m = 1, and "No" by m = 0. Recall that Wi represents the individual-specific factors 
and Zj the proposition related factors. 
Let Vi represent the utility an individual voter receives from voting on a proposition. 
If the errors are independent, identically distributed, and from an extreme value distri­
bution, then McFadden (1981) demonstrates that the probability of voting by the ith 
individual on the jth proposition is given by: 
. . eV1(W,,Z1) plJ - --------1 eV1(W,,Z1) + eVo(W;,Zj)' 
(1) 
where P�j P�{=l). We assume that Vi(lV;, Zj) is linear in its parameters, with Vk(vVi, Zj) 
= o:PiVi + ,B�Zj, where o:k and ,Bk are the weights given to factors vVi and Zj, respectively. 
Then, 
ea; v\!; +f3� Z1 Pl) 1 - "I' +f3' z I L\1 +{3' z . eO] t I ] ) + eOO r I 0 ) (2) 
We impose the normalization, a0 = fJ0 = 0, and let a = 0:1 and ,B = /31 so that equation 
(2) may be rewritten: 
p'1 = 
1 
I 1 + e-[o'W,+.6'Z1]' (3) 
Similarly, if Um denotes the utility of \'Oting '''{es" on a proposition, then the condi­
tional probability of voting "\'es" given that a vote is cast is given by: 
(4) 
where we impose the normalizations 60 = /o = 0, 6 = 61, / = 11, and where 
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4.2 Weighting 
Since our sample of absentee and precinct voters is not random, it is necessary to reweight 
the data in the log-likelihood function to compensate. For a random sample, the sample 
average log-likelihood converges to 
E[L(y; B)] E[E(L(y; B)lx)J 
j E[L(y;B)lx]r(x)dx (5) 
where r( x) is the distribution of x in the population, and L(y; B) is the sample average 
log-likelihood function. 
When the observations come from a non-random sample with probability density 
s( x ), the sample average log-likelihood converges to 
j E[L(y; B)lx]s(x)dx. (6) 
Optimization of equation (6) with respect to e will not in general lead to the true pa­
rameter 00, which is obtained when optimization is done with respect to equation (5). 
When sampling weights are observed, it is possible to reweight the sample log­
likelihood using the weights w(x) = r(x)/s(x). The weighted log-likelihood w(x)L(y; B) 
converges to 
j E[L(y; B)w(x)lx]s(x)dx = E[L(y; B)]. 
The weighting w( x) corrects for the non-random nature of the original sample. Let PP be 
the probability of precinct voting in the sample for congressional district i and let (I-Pl) 
be the probability of absentee voting in the sample. Let Q& be the probability of voting 
"Yes" in the sample for congressional district ion initiative j, and let (1 - Q&) be the 
corresponding probability of voting "No" in the sample. Let piA and Qj denote the true 
probabilities of precinct-voting and yes�voting in the population. Then R( xi) = P/Qj 
and S( Xi ) = PP Q& are the unconditional sample and population probabilities for precinct 
and yes-voting respectively. The weighting to correct for non-random sampling sets 
pAQJi 
( ) 
1 !J W Xi = pSQS 1 1) 
for observations that precinct vote "'r'es.'' Similar weights are calculated and applied 
for other combinations of precinct/absentee voting and voting yes/no.12 Estimation is 
performed within the Statistical Soft.wan Tools econometric package (Dubin and Rivers 
( 1988) ) . 
12Refer to Manski and Lerman ( 1977) for additional details regarding the weighted exogenous sampling 
maximum likelihood method. 
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5 Factors Affecting Voting Behavior 
Prior studies of proposition voting suggest that there is a relationship between voting 
behavior and both proposition-specific and individual-specific variables, independent of 
the effects of voting absentee or voting at the precinct. The anticipated impact of the 
proposition-specific variables are described first. Although the individual-specific vari­
ables are not the focus of this paper, a brief discussion of their impact on voting and 
voting "Yes" is also given below. 
The proposition-specific variables analyzed in previous studies include the proposition 
form, content, reading ease, and number of English words in the official ballot descrip­
tion. Voters tend to vote more often on bonds and initiatives than legislative proposals 
(Dubin and Kalsow (1994a) ). Because many hundreds of thousands of registered voters 
must sign the petition for an initiative, there tends to be wider pre-election visibility of 
initiatives as compared to legislative proposals.13 Bonds also tend to reflect "pocketbook 
voting" theories since the issuance of bonds has an economic impact on each voter. In 
addition, as compared to legislative proposals, bonds and initiatives receive more "Yes" 
votes. Legislative proposals may receive higher numbers of "No" votes simply because 
of the reason the legislature placed those issues on the ballot. Although some legislative 
proposals are constitutional amendments that are required to be put before the people, 
many of the legislative proposals are extremely controversial issues. In fact, in some 
cases the legislature determines that it would cost them more political capital to cast a 
public vote in the legislature on the issue than it would to turn the issue over to their 
constituents. If this is the case, than we expect that there are more "Yes" votes on bonds 
and initiatives as compared to legislative proposals. 
Proposition content also impacts the propensity of voters to cast votes and to vote 
"Yes" for a proposition. Dubin and Kalsow (1994a) find that voters tend to vote more 
often on issues that affect their daily lives, such as education, welfare, health, and taxes. 
They also find that people vote "Yes" more often on issues such as welfare and education. 
Although suggesting that voters will vote "Yes" less often on tax issues is consistent with 
"pocketbook voting," there are tax issues, such as those for cigarette and alcohol, that 
tend to be less related to a voter's checkbook than others such as property taxes. There 
are also tax issues such as proposition 1 63 in 1 992 that repeal a tax on certain food 
products. As a result, it is difficult to predict the reaction of voters to tax issues in 
general. 
The proposition characteristics also af ect the propensity to vote and to vote "Yes." 
A proposition's reading ease and number of English words are positively and negatively 
related, respectively, to proposition voting (Dubin �nd Kalsow (1994a)). Based on our 
previous work we also anticipate that voting "Yes" will be positively related to reading 
ease and negatively related to the number of English words in the official ballot description 
13California law requires signatures from registered voters to place an initiative on the ballot. The 
number of signatures ranges from at least five percent of the number of ballots cast in the last guberna­
torial election for statutes to eight percent of the same number for constitutional amendments. 
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(Dubin and Kalsow (1994a)). 
The individual-specific variables that have been considered in prior studies include 
race, socioeconomic, and social connectedness factors. Their impact on voting and voting 
"Yes" on propositions varies. We anticipate a negative relationship with voting and the 
percentage of African-Americans (Vanderleeuw and Engstrom (1987)), a negative rela­
tionship with income (Dubin and Kalsow (1994b) ), a negative relationship with education 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980)), and a positive relationship with homeownership (Du­
bin and Kalsow (1994b)). In addition, we expect that African-Americans will vote "Yes" 
more often, as will those with higher incomes and lower levels of education. A negative 
relationship between voting "Yes" and homeownership would be consistent with our prior 
work.14
6 Hypotheses 
The affect of the voting method (absentee or precinct), proposition form, content, and 
ballot characteristics on voting and voting "Yes" are the primary focus of this study. 
In this section we provide hypotheses for each of these variables as they relate to our 
analysis of proposition voting. In addition, we briefly discuss the impact of demographic 
factors and party affiliation that may be specific to absentee voters. 
Since we know that absentee voters complete less of the ballot than their precinct 
voting counterparts, we anticipate a negative relationship between voting on propositions 
and absentee voting (Dubin and Kalsow (1994a)). Whether absentees actually voted 
"Yes" more or less often in the 1992 election depends on the specific propositions.15 For 
example, if the election were to contain propositions that are conservative or pro-business, 
then one might expect a positive relationship between absentees and voting "Yes." This 
would follow if absentee voters are more conservative than precinct voters, as Cook (1991) 
and Willis (1994) suggest. However, the correlation at the election level depends on the 
composition of the entire slate of propositions. 
At this point it is difficult to predict any relationship between either voting or voting 
"Yes" on a proposition with the proposition's form or content. Since the press attributes 
absentees with conservative tendencies, we might expect propositions that impose direct 
costs on taxpayers to receive fewer "Yes" votes by absentees. Of course, this expectation 
implies that absentees "suffer" from a more severe case of "pocketbook voting" than 
do their precinct voting counterparts. The tendency to vote "No" more often would 
14For a complete discussion of the effects of race and socioeconomic factors on proposition voting see 
Dubin and Kalsow ( 1994a). 
15This analysis is conditional on the decision t.o vote absentee or at the precinct. Given that choice, the 
next decisions of whether or not to vote on a proposition and to vote "Yes" versus "No" are temporally 
separate. One could also examine the decision by individuals to cast absentee ballots using this dataset. 
However, given the level of demographics that can be matched to absentee ballots our previous county 
level time-series cross section model of absentee voting provided a better analysis of that decision. See 
Dubin and Kalsow (1995). 
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be extended to bonds in general (proposition form) and any other propositions with 
potential costs, i.e., those related to taxes (proposition content). 
If voters select their method of voting based on an opportunity cost of time model, 
and if absentee voting is more convenient, then we anticipate a negative relationship 
between the number of English words and voting on propositions for absentees. It could 
also be argued that absentee voters can rely on their sample ballots and the election 
information sent to every registered voter in California. However, if absentee voters are 
truly rushed for time, the tendency to skip the propositions with the longest descriptions 
will outweigh any advantage of voting at home. 
As far as the race, socioeconomic, and social connectedness factors are concerned, we 
do not hypothesize any difference in either voting or voting "Yes" between absentee and 
precinct voters. Prior theoretical and empirical work on absentees does not suggest any 
direction or significance for these relationships. 
Although the popular press would project a positive relationship between absentees 
and Republican party support, Dubin and Kalsow (1995) find a lack of evidence for this 
supposition. As the relationship between Republican registration and absentee voting 
is not completely described by income, education, or race, party affiliation may impact 
the propensity to vote and vote "Yes."16 If we follow the pattern of higher Republican 
turnout in elections down to the ballot level, then Republican party affiliation will be 
positively related to voting on propositions. However, as noted above with respect to the 
absentee variable, the statistical significance and direction of the relationship of voting 
"Yes" and party affiliation depends on the specific propositions on the ballot. 
7 Results 
The estimated proposition voting model is given in Table 2. To analyze the effects of 
proposition form and content for absentee voters as compared to precinct voters we have 
constructed a series of hypotheses tests based on the estimated model reported in Table 2. 
The results of the hypothesis tests for proposition form are summarized in Table 3 and 
those for proposition content are in Table 4.17 Inspecting Table 3 we find that absentee 
voters cast fewer votes on bonds and initiatives than do precinct voters. (Refer to the rows 
labeled "BOND" and " INITIAT IVE" and the column labeled "VOTE" in Table 3.) Both 
16 A regression of the log odds of Republican registration on the demographic variables accounts for 
approximately 46 percent of the variance. 
17N ote that Tables 3 and· 4 ·summarize the results in Table 2 for absentee voters relative to precinct 
voters. For example, the effect of voting on a bond by precinct voter is measured by the coefficient of 
"Bond" as reported in Table 2. However, for an absentee voter, the effect of voting on a bond is the 
summation of the coefficients on the "Absentee," ''Bond," and "Bond *Absentee" variables reported in 
Table 2. Table 3 provides a summary of the net effect ("Absentee" plus "Bond* Absentee" coefficients) 
and the statistical significance of that net effect. For example, in the row labeled "BOND" and the 
column labeled "VOTE," there is a negative sign, implying that absentee voters vote on bonds less often 
than do precinct voters, and this difference is statistically significant. 
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cells contain negative signs, demonstrating a decreased propensity for absentee voters to 
cast votes for these proposition types as compared to precinct voters. Similarly, the entry 
found in the row labeled "LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL" and the column labeled "VOTE" 
contains a zero, implying that there is no distinguishable difference in the voting behavior 
between absentee and precinct voters for legislative proposals. The results summarized 
in Table 4 indicate that absentee voters also vote more frequently on tax related issues 
than do precinct voters, perhaps related to their higher incomes (Dubin and Kalsow 
(1995)). In addition, there does not appear to be any difference in the propensity to vote 
on "HUMAN" and "OTHER" propositions between absentee and precinct voters. 
[Tables 2, 3, and 4 Here] 
The results related to proposition characteristics, demographics, and party affiliation 
are also given in Table 2. As anticipated, the easier a proposition is to comprehend 
the more often people cast votes. Our hypothesis that absentee voters may be rushed 
and therefore unwilling to wade through long propositions is supported by the negative 
relationship between number of English words and voting for absentees. The Republican 
registration variable is positively related to voting on propositions. However, Republicans 
who use the absentee format are no more or less likely to vote for a proposition than are 
the precinct voting Republicans. 
The estimates for the voting "Yes" model are given in Table 5. Tables 3 and 4 provide 
a summary of the results for proposition form and content on voting "Yes," under the 
column heading "VOTE YES." The "INITIATIVE" row in Table 4 shows that absentee 
voters support initiatives more often than do precinct voters. However, the other two 
rows indicate that absentee voters are more inclined to oppose bonds and legislative 
proposals than are their precinct voting counterparts. Absentee voters also seem to have 
benevolent tendencies when it comes to issues related to education, welfare, health care, 
and physician-assisted death. However, as the "TAXES" and "OTHER" rows indicate 
in Table 4, absentee voters consistently oppose taxes and other issues related to state 
government, toll roads, rail transit. and term limits. 
[Table .5 Here] 
The results,regarding the reading easP and 'm1mbe:t of English words are consistent 
with our hypothesis. We find that the easier the proposition text is to read on the 
ballot, the more voters will support that proposition. In addition, the longer the descrip­
tion of the proposition, the more impatient the voter becomes, and the less support the 
proposition receives. One surprising result is that related to African-American absentees. 
Although we did not hypothesize any difference between African-American absentee vot­
ers and precinct voters, it appears that African-American absentee voters vote "No" more 
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often than do their precinct counterparts.18 The results of the remaining demographic 
variables are similar to those obtained in Dubin and Kalsow (1994a). Since the previous 
Dubin and Kalsow study was not an analysis specific to 1992, we find evidence that our 
current results are not specialized to this specific election. 
8 Discussion and Conclusion 
Clearly the form and content of propositions do matter when a precinct or an absentee 
voter is considering her option to cast a. vote and whether to cast a "Yes" or "No" vote. 
If absentee and precinct voting are substitute activities in general elections (Dubin and 
Kalsow (1995)), albeit not perfect substitutes, then some individuals are simply changing 
their mode of voting while others are becoming voters. In addition to the changes in the 
composition of the electorate, however, there appears to be shifts in the typical voter's 
behavior when they vote absentee as compared to voting at the precinct. Thus the 
switch from precinct to absentee voting is not as innocuous as it first appears. The 
representativeness of an election is affected not only by the composition of the electorate, 
but also by their behavior. While the supporters of liberalizing absentee laws have 
claimed that it would increase the number of voters, it does not appear to have done so. 
Moreover, participation has in fact decreased if one counts the number of propositions 
on the ballot that receive notice by voters. 
An important conclusion from our study is related to the conventional wisdom re­
garding voters and non-voters. If voters and non-voters have similar demographics and 
political attitudes, and if this pattern extends to absentee and precinct voters, then we 
would not expect any difference in direct legislation voting based on those factors. Our 
research supports this notion as we do not find any differences in absentee and precinct 
voters' propensity to vote or vote "Yes'' based upon education, income, race, homeown­
ership, or party affiliation. 
We could speculate what would have happened without the liberalization of absentee 
voting laws, but a more useful exercise is to investigate who will now benefit from the 
legislative change. If the number of absentee voters continues to increase and if they 
maintain the apparent differences in voting behavior that we have found, then it may be 
incumbent upon interest groups and other proposition campaign groups to examine the 
voting behavior of absentees. If it is feasible to identify potential supporters for certain 
propositions and if interest groups have the fiscal resources, then they have the oppor­
tunity to join the "get out the absentee vote'' movement. Both proposition supporters 
and oppositi-0n groups could begin to encouJlage absentee voting either by independent 
efforts or in an alliance with a larger partisan candidate effort. 
To date we have found that the representativeness of proposition outcomes may be 
affected by the extent of absentee voting. If absentee voters are more conservative and 
18Since the effect of the other socioeconomic factors we examined did not differ between absentee and 
precinct voters, we tend to discount this result and regard it as plausibly spurious. 
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have higher incomes and educational levels, combined with the fact that they behave 
differently when voting on propositions, then election outcomes may be different than 
they would have been without the liberalization of absentee laws. Since ballot completion 
can also be considered as a stage in a political participation model, the ability to cast an 
absentee ballot may have actually decreased participation. 
Further research is required to determine the impact of absentee voters on partisan 
and non-partisan candidate races. Additionally, in recent years Californians have begun 
employing opposing or strategic propositions as a.method for defeating other propositions. 
This situation leads to an opportunity for voters to vote either sincerely or strategically. 
Because absentee voters are voting in the comfort of their homes their ability to sort 
through such competing propositions may be different than that of precinct voters. The 
patterns of voting on competing propositions should be examined in light of differences 
in voting behavior between absentee and precinct voters. 
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Indicator for absentee voters. 
Indicator for bonds. 
Indicator for initiatives. 
Indicator for propositions whose content deals with 
education, health, welfare, or physician-assisted death. 
Indicator for propositions whose content deals with state 
taxes, food taxes, or property taxes. 
Flesch index score for the proposition's official ballot 
description (divided by 100). 
Word count of the English version of the proposition's 
official ballot description (divided by 100). 
% of population reporting African-American. 
Median family income in 1989. 
% of population over age 25 not completing high school. 
% of households residing in owner-occupied homes. 
% of registered voters that are Republican. 
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Table 2: PROPENSITY TO VOTE 
ESTIMATED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
Constant 1.763 *** 5.98 
Absentee -0.148 -1.25 
Proposition Form 
Bond 0.187 *** 3.67 
Bond* Absentee -0.112 * -1.65 
Initiative 0.190 *** 4.13 
Initiative * Absentee 0.131 ** 2.39 
Proposition Content 
Humanitarian 0.453 *** 14.56 
Taxes 0.237 *** 6.86 
Taxes * Absentee 0.092 ** 1.99 
Proposition Characteristics 
Reading Ease 0.605 *** 7.00 
English Words 0.344 ** 1.87 
English Words * Absentee -0.643 *** -2.73 
Demographics 
African-American -0.263 -1.51 
Median Income -0.124 *** -3.08 
Low Education -0.865 *** -2.67 
Homeownership 0.505 *** 3.58 
Party Affiliation 
Republican 0.755 *** 3.17 
Log Likelihood - Initial -90443 
Log Lik-elih.ood ,_,Convergence -44543 
Number of Observations 130481 
Note: *p=.10, ** p=.0.1, *"""p=.01 
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Table 3: EFFECT OF PROPOSITION FORM ON ABSENTEE V OTERS 
I PROPOSITION FORM I VOTE I VOTE YES I 
BOND - -
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 0 -
INITIATIVE - + 
Note: "+" represents an increased propensity for 
absentee voters to perform the specified task. A "-" 
implies a decreased propensity for absentee voters to 
perform the specified task. A zero, "O", indicates no 
statistically significant effect. These measurements 
are made relative to the group of precinct voters. 
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Table 4: EFFECT OF PROPOSITION CONTENT ON ABSENTEE V OTERS
I PROPOSITION CONTENT 
HUMAN: EDUC., WELFARE, HEALTH 
TAXES: STATE, PROPERTY, FOOD 
OTHER 




Note: " + " represent and increased propensity for absentee voters 
to perform the specified task. A "-" implies a decreased 
propensity to perform the specified task. A zero, "O", indicates 
no statistically significant effect. These measurements are made 
relative to the group of precinct voters. 
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Table 5: PROPENSITY TO VOTE YES CONDITIONAL ON V OTING 
ESTIMATED 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STATISTIC 
Constant 1.138 *** 5.06 
Absentee -0.118 *** -4.54 
Proposition Form 
Bond 0.102 *** 2.90 
Bond * Absentee -0.226 *** -5.50 
Initiative 0.998 *** 31.38 
Initiative * Absentee 0.309 *** 9.90 
Proposition Content 
Humanitarian -0.560 *** -23.30 
Humanitarian * Absentee 0.171 *** 5.38 
Taxes 0.477 *** 20.35 
Taxes * Absentee -0.096 *** -2.98 
Proposition Characteristics 
Reading Ease 0.402 *** 6.53 
English Words -3.579 *** -30.33 
Demographics 
African-American 0.507 *** 3.86 
African-American* Absentee -0.374 *** 3.77 
Median Income (OOO's) 0.087 *** 2.86 
Low Education 0.396 1.56 
Homeownership -0.457 *** -4.35 
Party Affiliation 
Republican -0.354 ** -1.98 
Log Likelihood - Initial -79918 
Log Likelihood - Convergence -77885 
Number of Observations 113359 
Note: *p=.10, **p=.05. "'"""p=.01 
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